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ABSTRACT 
Capability theorists claim that real freedoms should constitute the informational basis for assessing 
individual wellbeing. Nevertheless, they have not yet developed a normative theory of social justice 
accounting for why or under what circumstances a political community has the obligation to mitigate 
deficits in real freedoms. This paper examines whether combining Luck Egalitarianism principles with 
capabilities as a metric of advantage can deliver an acceptable solution to this problem. However, in 
light of its inconsistency with the core claims found in capability literature, this paper ultimately rejects 
that possibility for two reasons: First, because it disregards the multidimensional character of the 
metric. Second, because it undermines the notion that capabilities are valuable not just because they 
represent positive freedom but because of the beings and doings they enable. 
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RESUME 
Les théoriciens de l’approche par les capabilités affirment que les libertés réelles devraient constituer 
la base informationnelle pour évaluer le bien-être individuel. Néanmoins, ils n'ont pas encore élaboré 
une théorie normative de la justice sociale expliquant pourquoi et dans quelles circonstances une 
communauté politique a l'obligation d'atténuer les déficits dans les libertés réelles. Cet article examine 
si la combinaison des principes de l'égalitarisme des chances avec les capabilités en tant que mesure 
de l'avantage peut fournir une solution acceptable à ce problème. Cependant, à la lumière de son 
incompatibilité avec les revendications de base trouvées dans la littérature sur les capabilités, cet 
article rejette finalement cette possibilité pour deux raisons: Premièrement, parce qu'elle ne tient pas 
compte du caractère multidimensionnel de la métrique. Deuxièmement, parce que cela sape la notion 
que les capabilités sont valables, non seulement parce qu'elles représentent une liberté positive, mais 
aussi en raison des manières d’êtres et de faire qu'elles permettent. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Capabilities are real freedoms to do and to be which a person has reason to deem valuable. 
They are most widely used to define an evaluative area of individual wellbeing that is distinct 
from that of resources and welfare. A person has the capability to move around if she can 
indeed effectively move around once she decides to do so; if she is handicapped, for example, 
a wheelchair and adequate public facilities will be available to her regardless of whether or 
not she derives any pleasure from that. In this very basic picture, capabilities represent an 
evaluative space for assessing individual wellbeing (Sen 2009: 232-4). In other words, 
capabilitarian researchers appear to have a very modest goal: to simply offer an informational 
basis with which to assess individual wellbeing. 
These evaluative results are, without a doubt, important in and of themselves, as confirmed 
by the richness of their various practical applications. The reconceptualization of poverty as 
lack of capabilities has long guided and promoted different public policies and practical 
guidelines for fighting poverty. However, this modest goal makes it very difficult to defend 
capabilities against more complete theories of justice or to include them as a real alternative. 
For example, as Robeyns posited (2009b), the most acute problems of responsibility and 
duties that are omnipresent in liberal egalitarian discussions have been rarely assumed by 
capability theorists. Using capabilities as input for an evaluative exercise seems to exempt 
capability practitioners from taking a position on the adequate balance between efficiency, 
incentives and real freedoms, on how to compare deficits in real freedoms for different 
individuals, and who has, and under which circumstances, a perfect or imperfect obligation to 
remediate low levels of real freedoms. 
This paper makes an initial contribution to how capabilitarian theorists should face the 
normative challenges of a more complete account of distributive justice. If successful, this 
contribution offers a better normative justification as to why, for example, the political 
community has the obligation to ensure those capabilities for its citizens, why a certain 
threshold of such capabilities should be embodied in constitutional guarantees (Nussbaum 
2000), or why someone has the obligation to cover the costs of implementing a less than 
perfect (but comparatively better) public policy to reduce pressing inequality (Sen 2006, 
2009). In fact, the important practical implications of the capability approach are, at a bare 
minimum, that someone has the obligation to do something to alleviate the condition of 
someone who is rightly identified as poor. 
The goal of this paper is to confront capabilitarian theorists with one of the major normative 
challenges of the last twenty years, i.e. how an egalitarian society should deal with 
individuals who decrease their own wellbeing through their free individual choices and the 
resulting consequences of those choices. Are political communities obligated to keep granting 
resources to their imprudent, lazy, and reckless members? Should political communities 
strive to improve the wellbeing only of those individuals whose decreased wellbeing is a 
result of unchosen circumstances that exceed the person’s control? In short, the main question 
in this essay is whether the defense of capabilities as the metric of egalitarian justice implies 
that individual responsibility should reduce or expand the distributive obligations of the 
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political community. If the answer is yes, capabilitarian theorists would have to embrace 
Luck Capabilitarianism, according to which inequalities in real freedoms raise egalitarian 
concern only when they result from circumstances that are beyond the individual’s control. 
I will argue that a consistent defender of capabilities as the adequate metric of wellbeing 
should not place Luck Capabilitarianism at the head of a normative exercise. As I will show, 
multidimensionality and the instrumental and political value of capabilities are two arguments 
that derive from the core claims of the capabilities framework and render Luck 
Capabilitarianism an impossible conception. 
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I offer a plausible a priori account of Luck 
Capabilitarianism. I show that it has some textual support in the classic Capability Approach 
and explain why capabilitarian theorists might be tempted to embrace that account. In Section 
3, I claim that Luck Capabilitarianism justifies excessively harsh redistributive policies and 
undermines the multidimensional character of wellbeing. In Section 4, I show that Luck 
Capabilitarianism significantly reduces the value of capabilities as a result of its indifference 
toward situations in which individuals, due to their own choices, can no longer achieve a 
certain threshold of valuable functionings. 
2. LUCK CAPABILITARIANISM: AN OUTLINE 
According to Luck Egalitarianism, a political community’s obligations are contingent upon 
the presence of a choice or the presence of an unchosen circumstance. If a person’s situation 
is product of their choices, she is responsible for them and must bear all their consequences. 
If, on the other hand, her situation results from circumstances she could not reasonably 
control, she should not bear all their consequences. 
According to Seligman, this conception of distributive justice can be reduced to three claims: 
 (1) Distributions are the result of people’s choices and of chance. All factors that affect 
distribution are either choices or chance. 
(2) Any inequality in distribution is separable into parts traceable to a choice and parts 
traceable to chance. 
(3) Inequalities, or parts thereof, are just, if and only if, they are traceable to a choice, rather 
than chance. (Seligman 2007: 268) 
These principles derive from and specify a core luck egalitarian intuition: an egalitarian 
political community has the obligation to guarantee an equal starting point for individuals to 
pursue their life plans and develop a life that is consistent with their conception of good. 
Because people will choose heterogeneous activities and plans, after a while, they will 
achieve different levels of resources and capabilities. According to Luck Egalitarianism, it 
would be unfair to recreate that equal starting point. For example, this conception’s main 
rival ideal characters are free-riders and reckless people. The former voluntarily refuse to 
perform an action that is required of them by reasons of cooperation, but, nonetheless, enjoy 
the cooperative surplus; the latter choose to perform a specific action (e.g. fasting) despite 
their knowledge of the costs and risks of that action (e.g. being undernourished). According 
to Luck Egalitarianism, redistributing in favor of either of these ideal characters unequally 
distributes the costs of the choices made by individuals with different levels of prudence and 
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attitudes toward risk, while a third ideal character– the prudent and cooperative person–would 
then have to subsidize the cost of those choices (Stemplowska 2013; Dworkin 2000: 65-119; 
Kymlicka 2002: 72-75). 
Seen in this way, Luck Capabilitarianism could then be the normative outcome of the 
evaluative exercise performed by capabilitarian theorists in light of those three claims and 
this basic intuition. Thus, the only deficits in real opportunities with which an egalitarian 
must be concerned are those resulting from luck and not choice; i.e. as Peter Vallentyne has 
suggested, “individuals can in principle be held accountable for their past option luck in the 
sense of having no claim against others to compensation when things turn out unfavorably.” 
(2005: 365). In a moderate version, it could claim that our obligations are, at least, less 
demanding if a disadvantage has been the product of a choice rather than that of luck, which 
could neither be controlled nor anticipated. 
Luck Capabilitarianism is both directly and indirectly supported in both Nussbaum and Sen’s 
version of capabilities as the right evaluative space. As I will argue next, this should come as 
no surprise, as Luck Capabilitarianism has three features that are appealing to capabilitarian 
theorists. 
Its first appealing feature is that Luck Egalitarianism can assist the capabilitarian theorist in 
fulfilling a key promise of the capabilitarian approach: that it can account for personal 
heterogeneity in a way that no other metric can. Both Sen and Nussbaum are concerned with 
identifying the factors that explain variations in the conversion of resources into functionings, 
i.e. why people can transform the same amount of resources into different levels of valuables 
beings and doings (Sen 1999: 70-72; Nussbaum 2006: 164-8). However, since these factors 
are practically infinite, one could doubt the plausibility and manageability of a capabilitarian 
metric. If every conversion factor could raise claims of justice, the level of compensations 
required for their remedy would increase dramatically; and, as Pogge has claimed, it would 
entail unreasonable rankings of natural inequality (Pogge 2002). 
Luck Egalitarian principles could circumvent this shortcoming by restricting unequal 
conversion factors that should be relevant for reasons of justice. Because personal 
heterogeneity stems from different roots and causes, some distinctions are crucial for a sound 
normative exercise. Factors affecting conversion rates can be roughly classified into three 
groups: personal, natural, and social. Personal factors are the determinants of choices that 
constitute individual character: attitudes toward risk, talents, willingness to make efforts, 
tastes, ambitions, and the development of a conception of good. Natural factors are individual 
features that are independent of social structures; in addition, they are not morally deserved 
because they arise from biological or physiological processes: being tall, disabled from birth, 
healthy, clever, etc.; in short, they are factors arising from genetic traits. Social factors 
emerge as the byproduct of institutional and relational structures, habits, patterns of behavior, 
and social norms. Luck Egalitarianism claims that only natural and social factors must be 
taken into account. Therefore, Luck Capabilitarianism claims that unequal capabilities are 
relevant as long as social or natural factors are responsible for the unequal conversion of 
capabilities into functionings. 
This seems to fit nicely with some capabilitarian claims about personal heterogeneity. For 
reasons of justice, both Sen and Nussbaum have stressed the importance of taking into 
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account how natural factors can affect the conversion of resources into capabilities. These 
circumstances that are not chosen by the individual will call for special measures beyond a 
standardized conception of human needs and endowments, such as, adapting the 
infrastructure of public facilities, providing extra financial resources or devoting a 
considerable amount of resources to individual medical and social assistance (Sen 1992: 81-
82). Regarding social factors, let’s take, for instance, Sen’s position on sources of differences 
in conversion rates, i.e. relational source. Some members of a group may be deprived of 
cultural or communitarian functioning, not for lack of resources or choice, but because a 
prevailing majority excluded them from important cultural practices or public spaces. 
Powerful groups typically oppress minorities by limiting their options and blocking access, 
thus forcing the minority to choose from a less than equal set of opportunities (Brown 2005: 
323). It can be argued that what the excluded group lacks, and which causes that low 
communitarian functioning, are the social relationships required to fully participate in that 
community (Sen 1999: 89-90). If this is so, having or lacking said social relationships is 
neither up to the excluded group nor a reasonable option for its members, thus constituting a 
social factor for which the individual cannot be held accountable. 
This restriction of factors that are relevant in normative exercises can also be found in 
seemingly clear examples of personal factors. For example, Robeyns and Pierik (2007) have 
claimed that there are various cases in which presumably free individual choices are limited 
not only by the options available to the individual, but also by subtle and informal forms of 
discrimination or an unequal division of labor. It is only because of these unstated rules of 
behavior and expectation that the consequences of those “free” choices become relevant to 
the capabilitarian theorist. Thus, pure personal factors that result in poor levels of capabilities 
would not be relevant for reasons of social justice, i.e. heterogeneity in conversion rates from 
resources to functionings is not a normative issue in itself, but it gains significance when 
certain differences can be traced back to certain circumstances (Pierik and Robeyns 2007). 
Its second appealing feature easily stems from the character of the normative exercise for 
which capabilities aspire to be the metric. Mainstream theories of social justice are not 
outcome-based but opportunity-based theories sustaining that a choice made under egalitarian 
conditions is sufficient to hold people accountable (Robeyns 2000: 10). Therefore, Luck 
Egalitarianism provides capabilitarian theorists with a conception of why it is important to 
secure equal initial capabilities and when unequal capabilities fail to constitute examples of 
unequal opportunities. After all, if a conception of positive freedom is developed mainly 
within a liberal framework (as is the case of the capability approach), individual choices 
should have a central place when defining obligations. If this conception didn’t claim that 
individual choices represented some kind of limit to what a political community can demand 
from its members, then it would reenact the objections posed by Isaiah Berlin. 
For instance, in Inequality Reexamined, Sen seems to embrace this luck egalitarian 
interpretation of equality of opportunities. He acknowledges that “if the social arrangements 
are such that a responsible adult is given no less freedom than others, but he still wastes the 
opportunities and ends up worse off than others, it is possible to argue that no unjust 
inequality may be involved” (1992: 148). While it is true that this acknowledgment is heavily 
qualified by the challenging task of differentiating between voluntary factors and unchosen 
factors in particular choices, i.e. as uncertainties exist, obtaining adequate information is 
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difficult and costly, and choices are subject to numerous social determinants, motivations, 
and preference shapers (1992: 149), Sen’s move is still undoubtedly ambiguous. On the one 
hand, the luck egalitarian component is qualified and isolated to a very abstract and 
theoretical possibility. After all, capabilities have been mainly applied and developed under 
the backdrop of poverty and extreme inequality; therefore, applying fixing criteria before 
such backdrops could result in error and harsh treatment. On the other hand, Sen does not call 
into question Luck Egalitarianism’s general claim; i.e. as Robeyns (2009a: 78) sustains, the 
focus on poverty “does not absolve theorists of justice who deal with justice in affluent 
societies (or affluent sections of poor societies) from discussing the just division between 
personal and collective responsibility.” 
Alternatively, let’s take Nussbaum’s account as stated in Frontiers of Justice. According to 
her, individuals who freely choose not to function well (for instance, by smoking, having 
unsafe sex or boxing), should not be considered any worse off than others who freely choose 
to function well (2006: 171). If they have chosen that functioning, they should be held 
accountable for the result, and nobody has the obligation to improve their final situation. 
However, in a similar spirit to Sen’s qualifications, she also thinks that the connection 
between certain particular functionings to a truly human life justifies discharging the 
individual from the full responsibility of the costs of certain imprudent or risky choices 
(2000: 91-5). This limitation of the principle of responsibility could be endorsed by a 
sophisticated and pluralistic version of Luck Egalitarianism; for instance, it could claim that 
for reasons other than justice (solidarity, assistance, etc.), there could be some discharge of 
responsibility from the imprudent; but, at the same time, if there is a conflict or if there is any 
shortage, the imprudent would be the last in line (Stemplowska 2013). 
Its third appealing feature is the selection of capabilities, and not functionings, as the metric 
for egalitarian justice. According to one repeated and central example in Sen’s texts (1999: 
76; 2009: 237), two individuals have a low nutritional index, or in his own terms, enjoy the 
same level of the achieved functioning of being well-nourished. However, for religious 
reasons, one has decided to fast while the other lives in a famine-inflicted region and is 
starving. The difference between these two people is in their capabilities set, i.e. their real 
freedoms: the second person is a victim of famine throughout her region and cannot avoid 
being hungry. The first person, instead, chooses to be hungry; her choice not to eat is what 
makes her a fasting and not a starving person (Carter 2014: 85) 
Admittedly, this example is used by Sen to show only that individual advantage should not be 
defined by looking at achieved functionings, as that would typically result in “false positives” 
in which, instead of identifying deficits in real freedoms, what would be identified are people 
who are not under any relevant disadvantage. Sen proposed the concept of “refined 
functionings” to account for this difference and capture the opportunities available to the 
agent at the moment of her decision: unlike mere achieved functionings, refined functionings 
are the beings and doings chosen by an agent (Sen 1987: 37). 
Notwithstanding Sen’s own reading, this example contains a tacit normative implication. The 
tacit implication is that it would be unreasonable for a political community to assume an 
obligation to improve the fasting person’s condition, but it would not be unreasonable for it to 
assume the obligation to improve the starving person’s condition. Because one key difference 
between these two cases is that the fasting person is under that condition by choice, while the 
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starving person is not, it seems that low levels of functionings or capabilities are only relevant 
for reasons of justice as long as they were not chosen; in other words, relevant disadvantages 
are reductions in wellbeing caused by the impact of luck. 
It is true that the capabilities metric is particularly sensitive to social and cultural norms that 
affect not only sets of opportunities but choice itself. Adaptive preferences are one of the 
many examples used by capabilities theorists to show that choices could depend on unjust 
structures and that it would be reasonable to dismiss them for normative purposes and 
evaluations (Anderson 2003: 245-8; Sen 1999: 62-3; Nussbaum 2000: 136-42). This degree 
of sensitivity would undoubtedly set Luck Capabilitarianism apart from the crudest and 
harshest versions of Luck Egalitarianism and perhaps open too narrow a space for its 
principle of responsibility. However, it still constitutes a viable interpretation. 
In this section, I have offered a rough outline of Luck Capabilitarianism and why 
capabilitarian theorists could be attracted to this account of how to distribute responsibilities 
and obligations pertaining to issues of social justice. In the next two sections, I will show that 
there are internal reasons for the capability metric to resist these appeals.      
3. THE PUNISHMENT DOESN’T FIT THE CRIME 
This section will show the first argument against Luck Capabilitarianism. Despite the features 
described in the previous section, I will claim that Luck Capabilitarianism overlooks a 
distinctive feature of capabilities as a metric of advantage, i.e. the multidimensional character 
of wellbeing. 
Capabilities cannot be reduced to a single and cardinal scale of real freedom. Each capability 
is, then, a real freedom to achieve a valuable functioning or, in Nussbaumian terms, a 
dimension of human activity that is fundamental for the dignity and the flourishing of the 
person; real freedoms in each dimension are separate, non-fungible and qualitatively distinct 
components, thus, no reasonable trade-off is possible between them (Nussbaum 2000: 81-2). 
Therefore, individual wellbeing is the combination of important and different real 
opportunities. This evaluative separateness does not mean, of course, that capabilities are not 
related in complex ways; if the political community promoted the capability for thought in 
some isolated group through a literacy campaign, then it would also have a positive effect on 
the group’s capability for political participation as well as its capability to control its 
environment; if, instead, the political community discouraged the capability for self-respect, 
the capability to have meaningful relationships with others would, in turn, be negatively 
affected. 
This multidimensional character is a distinctive feature of this metric because both resources 
and welfare constitute a single scale of wellbeing in which every being and doing is reducible 
to that metric (Alkire 2000: 85-89). This is clearly evident in how each metric assesses 
imprudent decisions. From a resourcist metric, an individual that gambles away and loses his 
resources ends up with a slightly smaller set of resources; from a welfarist metric, the person 
enjoys fewer opportunities for welfare, although the overall advantage is contingent upon 
subjective response. In contrast, from a capability metric, that same individual not only ends 
up with a smaller bundle of resources but, more importantly, with a smaller set of real 
opportunities, i.e. with a lesser degree of different freedoms. In short, adopting a capability 
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metric reminds us that, aside from imprudence, the individual no longer has the real option to 
achieve several functionings that are constitutive of his or her wellbeing. 
This theoretical feature of capabilities would become fundamental in the assessment of Luck 
Capabilitarianism. As I will show, if the normative exercise were performed with Luck 
Capabilitarianism principles, it would weaken the impact that free choices from one 
dimension of activity have on other dimensions of action. 
Imagine the following scenario in parallel to the case of the rich fasting man and the poor 
starving one. Both Kanye and Pedro suffer a medical condition that requires an expensive 
medication. Kanye is a billionaire that squanders away a considerable part of his fortune on 
expensive and extravagant parties; Pedro is a low-income worker that spends a substantial 
amount of money in bars. Let’s also suppose that both men arrived at their current level of 
wellbeing as a result of choices made against a backdrop of equal opportunities according to a 
resourcist metric. As an exclusive result of their respective choices and talents, Kanye still 
has plenty opportunities to live quite a comfortable and healthy life, while Pedro can’t even 
afford to buy his medications. 
There is no difference between Pedro and Kanye as far as the pleasure they each obtain or 
their attributive responsibility or even their initial set of opportunities. However, they are 
different in their set of capabilities. The republican language of non-domination can help to 
illustrate Pedro’s decrease in capability set. As a result of his choices, he has increased the 
chances of being dominated, i.e. of being interfered arbitrarily at the whim of others. He 
probably needs to borrow money from his friends and coworkers on a regular basis. In fact, 
he probably has to perform strategic actions, like humiliate himself by having to explain the 
reasons for his (repeated) cash-flow shortages, trying to disguise his habits and the pleasure 
and relief obtained from them. Since it is possible that, at some point, he will exhaust the 
good will of his closest circles, he will have to enter into increasingly dangerous and 
damaging relationships (e.g. with loan sharks) in order to get his medications. In short, he 
will have to anticipate the possible responses and attitudes of others, putting himself in a 
position of extreme vulnerability and dependency on their willingness to help him. On the 
other hand, since Kanye still has enough resources to buy his medications without relying on 
the mercy of others, he has not yet been dominated (Pettit 2012: 50-69; 114). 
This example highlights how free choices can affect different dimensions of wellbeing 
beyond the dimension on which the choice has been made. The significant relationship 
between dimensions of activity in Pedro and Kanye’s case is the same as that established 
between capability for practical reason and capability for bodily health. In Pedro’s case, his 
choices with respect to a fundamental capability (the capability of entertainment) have spread 
to other fundamental capabilities (mainly, the capability of being healthy), which is not his 
choice. Thus, Pedro becomes dominated, not because of his choices with regards to his 
capability for entertainment–which are roughly similar to Kanye’s–or because he has decided 
to be dominated, but because its consequences have spread to other capabilities. 
Luck Capabilitarianism is prone to missing this spreading effect and, therefore, overlooks the 
metric’s multidimensional character. In Pedro’s case, the resulting domination would not give 
rise to a justice issue; as long as decreases of real freedom were attributable to choice, and not 
to luck, there is no unjust inequality. After all, if Pedro made such choices, a life of poverty, 
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domination, and anxiety is the kind of life that he really wants since those are foreseeable 
consequences. Luck Capabilitarianism would insist that Pedro should have given more 
thought to the possible consequences of his choices and that, since there were no factors 
beyond his control forcing him to make those choices, he should internalize their costs, even 
if the results of his choices tend to spread to other freedoms. 
Two clarifications are in order at this point. First, it should come as no surprise that Luck 
Egalitarianism can justify instances of domination (Anderson 1999). Second, the role that 
domination plays in my argument must be explained. Since it is still problematic to take the 
relationship between freedom as non-domination and capabilities for granted (Sen 2009: 304-
9, Pettit 2001), domination is simply taken as a shortcut for situations in which individuals 
are so far below a threshold of capabilities that they must become dependent on others. 
Furthermore, although non-domination is not a multidimensional measure of freedom (Pettit 
2012: 44-7), I think it is not extremely controversial to describe cases of domination as those 
in which low levels of capabilities are interrelated but still affect different dimensions of 
beings and doings. 
Because of this multidimensional character, a capabilitarian writer should not accept this 
result of the normative exercise with regards to who has to internalize the costs of free 
choices. Accepting the inference from attributive responsibility to substantive responsibility, 
especially when that would entail letting a central capability of Pedro’s fall below a minimum 
threshold, renders the normative exercise insensitive to the spreading effects of free choices. 
In turn, this means denying that each capability is, in itself, an important dimension of action 
or being. 
Therefore, a political community that allows, for reasons of fairness, the spread of bad 
consequences to other important capabilities commits itself to excessively harsh punishments 
that exceed the dimension in which the choice was made. An individual that works 
inefficiently might get fired, but that is no reason to deny him welfare or unemployment 
benefits (Scanlon 1998: 293). The reason is the same. It is likely that the consequences of an 
imprudent decision involving a human activity can spread to other important capabilities. 
Low levels of real freedom in the infected capability raise egalitarian obligations because 
otherwise the political community would authorize punishments that exceed the crime. 
Therefore, because of the multidimensional character of capabilities, our egalitarian 
obligations do not disappear when a free choice results in a capability deficit. In other words, 
the adoption of a capability metric implies that, when there is a high chance that imprudent 
choices in one capability can infect other capabilities, there is a real justice concern, 
regardless of the attributive responsibility of the agent. 
4. OVERVALUING REAL FREEDOMS 
This section puts forward a second argument against Luck Capabilitarianism. I will argue that 
this way of performing the normative exercise implies overvaluing freedom to an extent that 
it misses important aspects of why capabilities and functionings are valuable. 
Some clarifications are in order before proceeding to the main argument. First, as Ian Carter 
(2014) has shown, capabilitarian theorists have not been clear about the value of real 
freedoms and it is possible to find different conceptions of what that value is. Each of these 
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conceptions provides a different answer to the question of why it is important for an 
individual’s wellbeing to have some level of capabilities. Despite this widespread ambiguity, 
it is a fundamental question for anyone who wants to use capabilities as a metric of advantage 
because one major reason for using it is that, unlike resources or utility, capabilities represent 
what is really important to an individual’s wellbeing (Sen 1992: 26-8; Nussbaum 2006: 69-
75). 
Simplifying Carter’s own distinction, real freedoms can have instrumental, intrinsic, and 
political value. A specific capability has intrinsic value if it is, in itself, one of the ends of life 
and should be respected; it has instrumental value if is dependent on what being or doing that 
freedom is used for; finally, it has political value if a political community is obligated to 
respect and guarantee it, despite individual choices and judgments. 
Second, this ambiguity is amplified by a typical internal tension between wellbeing and 
freedom that is caused by capabilitarian theorists (Arneson 2010: 107-9). On the one hand, 
capabilities, and not functionings, should be the aim of distributive justice. On the other hand, 
the value of capabilities seems to be entirely instrumental: capabilities are valuable because 
of the being or doing that they allow the individual to achieve. Beyond what procedure would 
deliver a list of relevant capabilities for social justice purposes, each of those elements 
constitutes a real freedom to achieve a valuable state of affairs or condition. For example, if a 
political community did not see any value in the functioning of moving safely from one place 
to another, then the freedom to do so would have no value. 
Tension arises when the capability approach is seduced by paternalistic temptations. Why 
not, as Claasen (2014) and Carter (2014) posited, force or give strong incentives to 
individuals to function in the way that the political community has agreed as really valuable? 
If the functioning of moving safely about is really valuable, why not offer tax breaks to 
people for getting out of their homes? The simpler way to dispel this tension is by attaching 
political value to capabilities. Forcing individuals to achieve valuable functionings would not 
respect the plurality of comprehensive doctrines and human diversity that translates into 
unequal conversion rates from capabilities to functionings, even under an initial point of real 
equal opportunities (Nussbaum 2000: 128-32; Sen 2009: 235-8; Robeyns 2009b: 404-5 for 
some exceptions to this). 
This tension, which is constitutive to capabilitarian theorists, is completely missed under 
Luck Capabilitarianism, according to which capabilities have only intrinsic value, i.e. they 
are important not for the functionings they could realize but for the freedom they represent. 
Luck Capabilitarianism would claim that an individual’s capabilities set express his or her 
moral identity because it includes, at every moment, the person’s free choices. On the 
contrary, when capabilities are affected by unchosen circumstances or by the actions of 
others, they no longer express that identity. In this sense, as Carter puts it, even if a person 
chooses not to function well, “the quality of her life would no longer be seen as zero, since 
the freedom she has to choose whether or not to function well will itself be of value 
regardless of what choices she makes” (2014: 89). 
For example, let’s compare Pedro’s situation above to that of William. Starting with the same 
capabilities as Pedro, William worked hard to develop his talents and, as a result, increased 
his real freedoms to wellbeing. Of course, William and Pedro’s current level of wellbeing is 
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unequal; while Pedro has low levels of various capabilities and is dependent on the good will 
of others, William has made wise choices and his current level of capabilities is pretty high. 
Luck Capabilitarianism will say that Pedro does not have a valid and just claim to further 
resources simply because his current capabilities level is low. This is so because his initial 
capabilities were equal to William’s and his choices were not forced by circumstances 
beyond his control; he has neither been wronged by anyone nor impacted by brute luck. 
Pedro should be held responsible for his current situation and should renounce to any possible 
compensation based on reasons of justice. Moreover, if William were to have to subsidize 
Pedro’s imprudent choices by transferring a part of his superior capabilities, the resulting 
pattern of distribution would be unfair, forcing William to cover the cost of Pedro’s choices. 
Furthermore, that transfer would leave William with fewer real opportunities to develop his 
true moral identity for reasons beyond his control. This would be true even if William chose 
not to convert those capabilities into functionings and said capabilities remained untouched. 
The obligation of a political community ruled under Luck Capabilitarianism is only to 
guarantee an equal starting position and then allow individual choices alone to determine who 
“wins” and who “loses” in terms of capabilities. 
Some could argue that dispelling this tension is what makes Luck Capabilitarianism an 
attractive way of completing the normative exercise. This is a mistake. This tension shows 
that intrinsic value is not the most important thing in the capabilitarian literature. While the 
capability approach typically separates the source of value of freedoms from the source of 
value of results, Luck Capabilitarianism reunites them, while omitting the fact that 
functionings are an important part of what gives capabilities their value. In fact, as I will 
show next, Luck Capabilitarianism could hardly include or uphold the political and 
instrumental values of freedoms. 
Taking the instrumental value of capabilities into account, we could judge that Donald’s 
position (who has used his real freedoms to achieve a valuable functioning) is better than 
William’s position (who has not used his real freedoms) and that William’s position is better 
than Pedro’s because, even if he chooses not to use his capabilities, he still has more chances 
than Pedro of acquiring a good functioning. Luck Capabilitarianism could not accept this 
ranking. If everyone had the same real initial opportunities, then everyone would have the 
same advantages as others or, at least, their compensation claim would never outweigh the 
claims of the “responsible” subsidizer. Therefore, functionings would not be valuable for 
Luck Capabilitarianism; rendering it very difficult to know why some capabilities should be 
included in a list while others should not. 
In addition, Luck Capabilitarianism cannot account for the political value of capabilities. The 
result of its core claims is that individual choices are identified with the individual’s own 
conception of the good life, independently of how those choices affect the individual’s future 
options and choices. One could argue, without sparking too much controversy, that in order to 
develop a comprehensive doctrine, one needs some experimentation, alternatives, and a 
variety of options from which to choose. If, on the one hand, individuals’ choices 
progressively reduce their capability set and capability to change their mind and if, on the 
other hand, there is no obligation to restore them at least to a degree of sufficiency, then, 
according to Luck Capabilitarian, their conception of good no longer seems to be the 
expression of their moral identity but that of the circumstances with which they were faced. 
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5. FINAL REMARKS 
In this paper, I have showed that capabilitarian theorists should resist the appeal of Luck 
Capabilitarianism because it is not a consistent way to perform the normative exercise of 
distributive justice. This is so for two reasons. First, Luck Capabilitarianism undervalues the 
multidimensional impact of reckless choices on individual wellbeing and sets the punishment 
bar too high. It may be reasonable to fire a reckless worker, but it is not reasonable to dismiss 
all of his claims for distributive justice. Second, Luck Capabilitarianism undermines the fact 
that capabilities are not just valuable because they represent a space of freedom, but because 
they are real freedoms to do or be something valuable and because they represent a normative 
space where individuals can develop and experiment with their own conception of good. 
This does not mean there is absolutely no room for judging individual responsibility at all in a 
normative exercise with capabilities as its informational basis. What I have shown is that the 
capability metric is a complex theory of wellbeing. This is so because, although it is a 
conception of equal opportunities, it is also a political conception of wellbeing sustaining that 
opportunities are, in part, valuable because they allow the individual to attain certain states of 
being or action that are valuable. Thus, the principles of individual responsibility should find 
a restricted place when distributing the duties and responsibilities of a political community. A 
normative exercise performed with capabilities as a metric should balance out demands of 
fairness and demands of individuals whose level of relevant capabilities is below a certain 
threshold of sufficiency and who cannot access valuable functionings. Luck 
Capabilitarianism is not useful for developing this sensitive balance between two normative 
demands because it claims that the latter demands are not justice claims. 
This complex feature of the capability metric is clear in its emphasis on adaptive preferences. 
This belief adjustment mechanism for decreasing frustration is morally problematic, among 
other reasons, because the preference in question is formed before a backdrop of unjust and 
oppressive opportunities. If a very poor person chose to perform a valuable functioning (for 
example, regularly checking her health condition), that preference would not be regarded as 
adaptive, regardless of how difficult it would be to satisfy said preference. What makes a 
preference adaptive is that, because of the oppressive social environment, the person does not 
select any of the multiple options deemed valuable by the political community. In this sense, 
the normative exercise involved in the capability metric needs to be complemented not only 
with a theory of equal opportunities but also a theory of egalitarian outcomes. 
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